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Abstract. The fission-product release to the atmosphere from a 
nuclear reactor during a hypothetical large accident is dis-
cussed, and the consequences in terms of doses to the popu-
lation are calculated. The reactor is a light-water reactor 
located at a site representing an idealized, simplified Danish 
location. 
Three release categories are discussed: The first is the re-
lease in an accident with a core meltdown and a major rupture 
of the containment. This release is represented by the BWR-2 
release of WASH 1400. The second is the release where the 
containment integrity is maintained, but there is a failure to 
isolate the containment. This release is represented by the 
PWR-4 release. The third is obtained as a best estimate from 
empirical data, and it is called the BEED release. The release 
of the BEED case is deduced from empirical evidence - especial-
ly the SL-1 accident - in a separate study which is described 
in the appendix. The release fractions for the most signifi-
cant elements such as iodine and cesium decrease by a decade 
from BWR-2 to PWR-4, and from PWR-4 to BEED, while the release 
fractions of the noble gases are assumed to be at an almost 
constant high level. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this study the fission-product release to the atmosphere 
fro« a nuclear reactor during a hypothetical/ large accident 
is discussed* and the consequences in terms of doses to the 
population are calculated. The reactor is a light-water re-
actor located at a site representing an idealised« simplified 
Danish location. 
The main parameter in this study is the fission-product release 
and three cases are studied: 
- A fission-product release as in a BHR-2 type accident 
(WASH-1400 nomenclature) 
- A release as for a PWR-4 type accident, 
- A release, obtained as a best estimate from the empirical data 
available, for a reactor system with a reducing atmosphere. 
This case is called BBED below. 
The many parameters in this study that describe the physical con-
ditions, e.g. the weather situation and the deposition vel-
ocities, are in general chosen so that representative conditions 
are obtained. 
2. ACCIDENT TYPES AND FISSION-PRODUCT RELEASES 
2.0. The Large Accident 
The large accident considered here for a nuclear power reactor 
is a hypothetical accident, where it is assumed that a full core 
..ie It down takes place for a power realtor. This type of accident 
has never taken place anywhere, and all information on the con-
sequences comes from theoretical analyses of hypothetical acci-
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dent sequences. WASH-1400 (The Rasmussen Report) is the main 
source for analysing the accident sequences, the consequences, 
and the probabilities of the accidents, thus yielding the 
total risk to the population. In WASH-1400 the probability of 
a core meltdown is calculated to be 5 x 10~5 per reactor-year. 
An operating nuclear power reactor core contains a huge amount 
of radioactivity (see Table 2). The rexeases from a melted 
core to the environment depend on the behaviour of the molten 
core material in the pressure vessel and containment, and the 
released fission-product paths through the containment and 
surrounding buildings to the open air. The behaviours of a melted 
core and of fission products on the scale of a power reactor 
are to be extrapolated either from experiments on a very small 
scale compared with the reactor, or fr» accidents experienced 
in actual reactors, where releases of the magnitude envisaged 
in the theoretical studies have never been approached. 
In the following, three cases with different levels of releases 
are discussed. The discussion relies to a large extend on 
the analysis of WASH-1400, and the object of interest is the 
fraction of the fission products in the core that is released 
to the atmosphere. The study here does not contain a full 
accident sequence and risk analysis, and the probabilities 
estimated below are inferred from the results of WASH-1400. 
2.1. BWR-2 
The first case is defined by the release category of BWR-2 in 
WASH-1400. This *.s one of the largest releases, where a signifi-
cant fraction of fission products is released to the atmosphere 
(see Table 1). (The release fractions of the "big" cases of 
WASH-1400: PWR-1, PWR-2, BWR-1 and BWR-2, are of the same 
order of magnitude). The category was chosen here because it 
was used in earlier Danish studies for the BarsebSck reactor 
(Hedemann Jensen et al, 1977). 
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The BWR-2 category involves a loss of all decay heat removal 
leading to a rupture of the containment due to overpressure* 
The core melts down after the containment rupture and as a re-
sult the released fission product fraction is high. The prob-
bability of a BWR-2-type accident is 6 x 10~* per reactor year 
according to WASH-1400. 
2.2. PWR-4 
The consequences of an accident depend strongly on whether the 
the containment fails or not, and if it does fail, on the fail-
ure mode and the time lag. 
Recent research, at the moment primarily directed towards PWRs, 
has led to an estimated probability of a containment failure 
following a core meltdown that is smaller than that found by 
the WASH-1400 programme. 
Experimental work at Sandia Laboratory in USA indicates that 
the probability of a steam explosion in the reactor vessel, 
which may cause containment failure, is two orders of magni-
tude lower than assumed in WASH-1400 (Berman et al, 1980). The 
probability of the most serious PWR release category in Wash-
1400, category 1, is thus reduced by two orders of magnitude. 
In Germany, at the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, theoretical 
and experimental work have shown that for a German PWR the time 
from a core melt until the overpressure failure of the contain-
ment due to steam and gas generation and hydrogen burning, is 
2-3 days (Rininsland et al, 1980). The melt-through of the con-
crete base mat in the containment is unlikely, and if it does 
occur, will take several months. It has also been shown 
that the concentration of radioactive materials in the contain-
ment atmosphere in 2-3 days will have decreased by 3-5 orders 
of magnitude. Thus the amount of radionuclides available for 
release to the environment at the time of containment failure 
is very small. It turns out that the release during the accident 
8 
will be d«t«rain«d by thm leak rat« from th« containment. For an 
isolated containment the design leak rate may be 0.25% of total 
volume per day. If the leak rate equals the design leak rate 
the amount of released radionuclides in accident sequences, 
which in WASH-1400 would give category 2 and 3 releases, will 
be 10-2-1o-3 times the WASH-1400 results. This is caused by 
the longer time interval between core melt and the containment 
failure in the new calculations, and the more refined models 
used for calculating the aerosol behaviour in the containment. 
Based on these results, it appears that the most probable 
serious consequences of core meltdown in a PWR will not come 
from the accident sequences described by PWR-1, -2 and -3, but 
from an accident sequence that includes a failure to isolate 
the containment. 
In WASH-1400 the PWR release category with a melted core and a 
non-isolating containment (and the containment radioactivity 
removal system failing as well) is PWR-4. Without going into a 
detailed study here of accident sequences leading to this situ-
ation, the PWR-4 release is taken as representative of the case. 
The probability of this release under these new assumptions, 
where the probabilities of the WASH-1400 PWR-1, -2 and -3 re-
leases are considered to be extremely small, is assumed here to 
equal the sum of the probabilities of PWR-1, -2, -3 and -4, 
i.e. ~ 1.4 x 10~5 per reactor year. 
The PWR-4 release fractions are shown in Table 1. The PWR-4 
release is roughly a factor of ten lower than for BWR-2, except 
for the noble gases, Xe-Kr. The PWR-4 release starts early, 
after 2 hours, due to the failure to isolate. 
2.3« BEEP 
Recently scientists in the USA have re-evaluated the infor-
mation available from reactor accidents, like that at Three Nile 
Island, and they have reported their findingst Only 
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a saall fraction of the fission products in the reactor core 
is released to the atmosphere (Stratton et al, 19*0, Levenson 
and Rahn, 1980). The most important radionuclide. 1-131, is 
not released; instead cesium iodide is* and this combines with 
the water in the system of a LWR, so that only a small fraction 
of the 1-131 is available for release to the atmosphere. 
A study of data from actual reactor accidents such as SL-1, 
Windscale, and THI, was made a part of this work, and the 
discussion of the conclusions to be drawn from the empirical 
data is given in the appendix. The data in the literature are 
often incomplete with respect to the measured results wanted 
here, but the conclusion of the study is that the empirical 
evidence shows that for a reactor system with a reducing water 
and steam environment, as in an LMR system, the release of 
fission products will be less than 1% of the core content 
(except for the noble gasses). This reduction is due to physi-
cal and chemical processes in the fuel, water, and buildings, 
and it is assumed here, as was argued above in the PWR-4 case, 
that the probability of an instantaneous removal of all con-
tainment isolation is exceedingly low, so that some amount of 
containment isolation and reducing atmosphere is maintained. 
The fission-product release obtained as a best estimate from 
empirical data, when the reactor system has a reducing atmos-
phere, is in the table and in the figures called BEED. The re-
lease fractions are given in the appendix and are shown in 
Table 1. 
The probability of an accident leading to a BEED category 
release is estimated here for simplicity to be equal to the 
probability above in 2.2 for the redefined PWR-4, i.e. equal 
to 1.4 x 10~5 per reactor year. 
The BEED release fractions are roughly a factor of 100 lower 
than those of BWR-2, and a factor 10 lower than those of PWR-4 
except for the noble gasses (see Table 1). The BEED release is 
assumed to start early, after 2 hours, like that for the PWR-4. 
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3. REACTOR SURROUNDINGS. CALCULATION HOOCLS AND PARAMETERS 
3.1. Reactor surroundings 
The nuclear power reactor is placed at an east coastal point* 
with the land covering 110° towards the west. 
The population density is 
0-5 ka SO persons A * 2 
> Ski 100 
The average population density of Denaark is 120 persons A a 2 , 
and the site defined above is a siaplified and idealised ver-
sion of a Danish site. It was considered in the study to place 
a aajor town of 2-300*000 inhabitants in the picture* but this 
was oaitted here* aainly because of the aaount of extra work 
in coaparing the aany curves and results. The population as a 
function of distance froa the reactor site is given in Table 3. 
3.2. The reactor 
The reactor is a light-water reactor of 2000 HMth' corresponding 
to - 600 Mf9. This sis« was chosen because it was used in 
earlier Danish studies. 
3.3. Fission-product releases 
The fission products produced in the reactor core are given in 
Table 2. The release fractions to the ataosphere are discussed 
above in Section 2. The fractions and characteristic tiet of 
release are given in Table 1. 
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3.4. Do« i—trie node i 
The Rise do—-consequence model, »LØC0N2, has been used for th« 
calculation of individual and collective doses. 
The dispersion model used in »LUC0N2 is the so-called Gaussian 
•odel. In this model it is assumed that the material released 
to the afosphere will be carried with the wind and spread like 
a smoke plus*. The eost important ateospheric paraaeters are the 
wind direction« wind »peed, and vertical teeperature gradient 
because these detemine the transport direction* dilution at 
the no sent of release« and turbulent mixing. 
The Gaussian eodel has been verified out to distances of 20 
to 30 ka where it is able to predict doses and concentrations 
within * factor of 2 - 3. At larger distances, doses and con-
centrations normally are overestiaated. This overestimate can 
be as large as a factor of 10 at SO KM. 
Plus* rise due to the heat content of the released Material 
is taken into consideration. The rise of the plus* is calcul-
ated according to a foraula given by Origgs. 
In the nodel both dry deposition and wash-out of the Material in 
the plus* is taken into consideration. Dry deposition is 
calculated according to the source depletion Model. 
The total dose to an individual is calculated as the sun of 
three dose components: 
Inhalation dose 
External gamaa dose from the plume 
External gamma dose from Material deposited on tfte ground. 
Th« collective dos« within a given area is calculated as the 
sun of the doses to the individuals within the area. Evacuation 
has not been taken into account. 
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A detailed description of PLUC0N2 is given in Thykier-Nielsen 
(1980). 
3.5. Meteorological parameters 
The meteorological conditions applied in all calculations of 
individual and collective doses are realistic conditions for a 
Danish reactor site. The meteorological conditions chosen are: 
Neutral stability (Pasquill category D) 
Wind speed 6 m/s 
Mixing height 1000 m 
No rain 
Wind from east (wind blowing towards west (270 deg.)) 
Wind direction, atmospheric stability, and wind speed are 
correlated. Based on Risø's meteorological statistics from 
the period 1958 to 19t>7 (see Jensen 1973) the probabilities 
(in per cent) are as follows: 
Probabilities of wind from east 
and strict east/ respectively 
Probability of Pasquill D (given 
the considered wind directions) 
Probability of wind speeds 6 m/s 
to 10 m/s (given the considered 
stability and wind directions) 
All 
100 
60 
40 
Wind directions 
East Strict east 
(00-180°) (75°-105°) 
42 
58 
38 
7.4 
55 
33 
The joint probabilities of the 
wind directions considered, Pas-
quill r> and wind speeds from 24 9.3 1.4 
6 m/s to 10 m/s 
Probabilities (per cent) of meteorological conditions. 
The probability of no rain when the stability is neutral LB 
80% to 901. 
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3.6. Parameters for dose calculations 
The dose calculations are based on the meteorological situation 
specified in 3.5 and the following assumptions: 
3.6.1. Deposition 
No wet deposition 
Dry deposition velocities: 
Iodine: 0.01 m/s 
Noble gases: No deposition 
Other isotopes: 0.002 m/s 
The choice of dry deposition velocities is based on Roed (1981) 
and Nielsen (1980). 
3.6.2. Dose calculations 
Inhalation doses 
During the overhead passage of the plume, a person standing on 
the ground will inhale an amount of radioactive material pro-
portional to the passage time and the concentration at the 
location in question. 
The total inhalation dose integrated over a given period of 
time after the activity was inhaled is calculated by multi-
plying the amount of each radionuclide inhaled with a dose-
conversion factor for this particular radionuclide, and then 
adding these products. 
The dose-conversion factor for a given radionuclide is equal 
to the dose per unit intake (in, e.g. Bq) integrated over a 
given period of time after the intake. 
The inhalation doses are reduced by the filtration effect of 
houses. Here a reduction factor of 0.2 for filtration is used. 
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This has been derived from recent Danish investigations (see 
Gjørup and Roed, 1980). 
External dose from the plume 
The decay of radionuclides is associated with the emission of 
radiation in the form of f-photons. 
The external y-dose from the cloud is calculated by assuming 
that the cloud is composed of an infinite number of point 
sources and deriving the total dose by integration. Attenuation 
and multiple scattering of the -y-rays in the air are included 
in the calculation of the dose from each point source. The y-
dose in the air is equal to the y-flux density multiplied by 
the mass energy absorption coefficient for each of eight y 
energy groups. 
Inside buildings, the external gamma dose from the plume will 
be reduced considerably due to the shielding effect of the 
structure. In this report it is assumed that people remain 
indoors in brick buildings during the entire passage of the 
plume. 
A shielding factor of 0.6 has therefore been applied. This fac-
tor is given in WASH-1400 as representative of single-family 
houses and multi-storey brick buildings. 
External dose from deposited activity 
The external y-dose from deposited activity is calculated by 
the same principles as the external dose from the plume; the 
ground is divided into a number of point sources and their dose 
contributions are integrated. By convention the dose in air is 
calculated at a point 1 m above the ground. 
In this study it is assumed that people stay indoors for the 
first 24 hours after the release has started. When the 24 hours 
have passed, it is assumed that they are outdoors 11% of the 
time. A shielding factor of 0.0769 is assumed in accordance 
with Gjørup (1981). 
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In this study both acute and long-term doses have been studied: 
Acute doses to the bone marrow 
Acute doses to the bone marrow have been calculated as the sum 
of: 
1. The external gamma dose from the clcud. 
2. The external gamma dose from activity deposited on the 
ground integrated over 24 hours. 
3. The internal dose received during the first 30 days after 
inhalation of activity from the cloud. (The main part of the 
dose to the bone marrow is received within 30 days). 
Long-term, committed effective dose equivalent to the whole body 
The long-term consequences of irradiation to the whole body is 
assessed from the committed effective dose equivalent. This is 
calculated here as the sum of: 
1. The external gamma dose from the cloud 
2. The external gamma dose from deposited radionuclides 
integrated over 
a. 24 hours, 
b. 30 days, and 
c. 30 years. 
3. The committed effective dose equivalent from inhalation of 
radionuclides during cloud passage. Tne calculation of this 
dose equivalent is based on an integration of the internal 
effects over 50 years, and it follows ICRP recommendations 
(see Table 4). 
The (total) committed effective dose equivalent is labelled ac-
cording to the integration time (24 h, 30 d, 30 y) for the ex-
ternal gamma dose from deposited radionuclides or, in other 
words, the period of staying. 
- 16 -
4. CALCULATION RESULTS 
The individual and collective doses calculated for the release 
categories BWR-2, PWR-4, and BEED are shown in Pigs. 4.1-4.8. 
In Pigs. 4.1-4.4 the individual doses from the 3 release 
categories are compared. 
4.1. 
The 30-year committed effective dose equivalent shows the 
largest differences between doses from different releases. At 
distances of 5 km or more the ratio of the doses from BWR-2 
and PWR-4 is about 10. The doses from BEED are a factor of 10 
lower than those from PWR-4. 
At 20 km the doses are: 
BWR-2: 89 rem 
PWR-4: 8.8 -
BEED : 0.95 -
Unlike the PWR-4 and BEED curves the BWR-2 curves have a pro-
nounced maximum/ due to the relatively large heat content and 
corresponding large effective dispersion height (65 m). In 
the PWR-4 and BBED cases the effective dispersion height is 
only 8 m. 
4.2. 
The differences are smaller for acute bone marrow doses (Fig. 
4.2). At distances of 5 km and more the doses from PWR-4 are 
a factor of 5 less than those from BWR-2. The BEED doses are 
about a factor of 10 less than those from BWR-2. 
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The smaller differences between doses compared with Fig. 4.1 are 
caused by the dose from noble gases constituting a larger part 
of the acute bone marrow dose than it does of the 30-year com-
mitted effective dose equivalent. In the BWR-2-case for example, 
the dose contribution from noble gases at 5 km constitutes 2.5% 
of the bone marrow dose while only 0.14% of the 30-year com-
mitted effective dose equivalent. 
4.3. 
The 24-hour (Fig. 4.3) and 30-day (Fig. 4.4) committed effec-
tive dose equivalent shows the same pattern as the previous fi-
gures as to the relative size of doses from the three releases. 
4.4. 
When considering long-term consequences of land contamination 
the question of relocation is important. In Gjørup (1981) 
several criteria for relocation have been discussed. These 
criteria might be of the form: If the dose to individuals could 
be reduced by X rem by moving them 24 hours after the release 
and letting them return to their home 30 days after the release 
then they must be relocated. Based on dose reduction criteria 
of X s 10 rem and data from Figs. 4.3 and 4.4, the maximum 
distances from the release point where relocation should take 
place is calculated as 
BWR-2 release: 15 km maximum relocation distance 
PWR-4 - : 3.5 -
BEED - : 0.9 -
The relocation distance for the BEED release is a factor of 4 
lower than the distances for the PWR-4 release and a factor of 
16 lower than those for the BWR-2 release. 
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4.5. 
The collective 30-year committed effective dose equivalent inte-
grated from 0.5 km to 50 km is shown in Figs. 4.5 and 4.9. It 
is seen from Fig. 4.5 that there is an order of magnitude be-
tween the collective doses from the three releases. 
The collective doses are: 
BWR-2: 1.9 x 106 manrem 
PWR-4: 0.21 x 106 manrem 
BBBD : 0.022 x 106 manrem 
The significance of the dose contributions from different 
isotope groups is also evident from Fig. 4.5 and is further 
illustrated in the following table: 
Isotope Release category 
group BWR-2 PWR-4 BEEP 
Iodine 22 28 30 
Noble gases 2 7 41 
Others 76 65 29 
Relative distribution of collective 30-year committed 
dose equivalent (per cent). 
A comparison of the doses from the BEED-release with those 
from BWR-2 and PWR-4 shows a significant increase in the rela-
tive contributions from noble gases. Note that the decreased 
release of iodine and other isotopes mainly gives a decrease 
in the relative dose contribution from the group: "other 
isotopes". 
4.6. 
The significance of the doses from different isotope groups is 
further illustrated in Fig. 4.6, which indicates the total acute 
bone marrow dose. Doses from the iodine group are dominant in 
the BWR-2 and the PWR-4 cases even if its significance decreases 
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with distance due to the large deposition velocity compared with 
other isotopes. The dose from noble gases is of little signifi-
cance in the BWR-2 case, while it is dominant in the BEED case. 
4.7. 
The 24-hour doses to individuals are shown in Fig. 4.7. The 
most important component of the bone marrow dose is the exter-
nal gamma dose from the plume. However, it is only in the BEED 
case that it is the only dose component of importance. This is 
due to the relatively low release fractions for iodine and 
other isotopes, which leaves the noble gases in a dominant 
position concerning doses. The noble gases contribute to 
the external gamma dose from the plume only and thus this dose 
component must be dominant in the BEED case. 
4.8. 
The 30-year whole body doses (Pig. 4.8) have been divided in 
dose components. In the BWR-2 and PWR-4 cases the doses are 
governed principally by the external gamma dose from deposited 
material and to a certain extent by the inhalation dose. In 
the BEED-release the amounts of iodine and other non-volatile 
isotopes have been reduced and the external gamma dose from 
the plume becomes the dominant dose component (about 50% of 
the total dose at distances of 10 km and more). 
4.9. 
The collective 30-year whole body dose accumulated from 0.5 km 
as a function of distance from the release point is shown in 
Fig. 4.9. The curves have a bend at 5 km due to the change in 
population density from 50 to 100 persons/km2. At 50 km the 
collective doses from the BEED release is one order of magnitude 
lower than those from PWR-4 and two orders of magnitude lower 
than the collective doses from BWR-2. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Recent work (on PWRs) shows that the probability is extremely 
small of the large accident with a core meltdown, where there 
is an early, major rupture of the containment, resulting in 
release of a large fraction of the fission products to the 
atmosphere. The work on containment integrity is expected to 
lead to an acceptance of the accident without an early large 
rupture of the containment as the most realistic description 
of the hypothetical large accident. The release fractions for 
the essential radionuclides are in this case one order of mag-
nitude lower than those used for the hypothetical large acci-
dent with rupture of containment. 
Studies of actual accidents show that the fission products 
from the reactor core are captured to a large extent through 
physical and chemical processes in a system with a reducing 
water-steam atmosphere, and only a small fraction of the fission 
products is actually released to the open air. When a solid 
foundation of knowlegde of the processes and scales involved 
is created through experiments, a realistic assessment can be 
made of the physical and chemical reduction of the fission 
product release to the atmosphere. It is expected on the basis 
of the empirical evidence seen so far that this will lead to 
releases which are at least an order of magnitude lower than 
those mentioned above. 
The doses to the population are obtained as a complex sum of a 
series of contributions. It is found that the (long-term) com-
mitted effective dose equivalent, individually as well as collec-
tively, is practically directly proportional to the fraction 
of the fission products released. (This was to be expected as 
the term "fraction of fission products" is related to the radio-
nuclides predominant in the doses). However, this proportionality 
is not maintained for the acute bone marrow dose. The reason 
is that the dose from noble gases constitutes a significant 
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part of the bone marrow dose, and the release of the noble 
gases is assumed to be almost the same for all three cases. 
The reduced release of iodine and non-volatile radionuclides 
in the best estimate (BBBD) case make the noble gases, which 
give an external gamma dose from the plume, the most signifi-
cant contributors, both for the long-term and acute doses. In 
comparison the acute dose for the BWR-2 and PWR-4 cases is 
primarily due to 1-131 in the plume, and the long-term dose is 
mainly that of the gamma dose from deposited activity. 
The fraction of the fission products released is the most 
essential parameter in the calculation of dose consequences of 
a hypothetical large accident at a nuclear power reactor. Future 
work should be devoted towards creating a solid foundation of 
knowledge concerning the processes and scales involved in the 
reactor and its containment during an accident. 
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Table 1. Fission-product releases 
Release tie« hours after shut-down 
Release period 
Initial release height 
r .p . 
MOt-2 
30 
J 
0 
release 
WR-4 
2 
3 
0 
case 
SEED 
2 
3 
0 
hours 
hours 
• 
Release fractions t 
Xe-kr 
I-Br 
Cs-Rb 
Te-Sb 
Ba-Sr 
Ru 
La 
100 
90 
50 
30 
10 
3 
0 .4 
( 0 
9 
4 
3 
0. 
0 . 
0. 
5 
3 
04 
CO 
1 
0 . 1 
0 . 5 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
t 
25 -
Isotop* 
Kr 03 a 
Kr 05 • 
Kr 05 
Kr 07 
Kr •• 
Kb •€ 
Kb 00 
Kb tt 
Sr S9 
Sr 90 
Sr 91 
T 90 
* 91 
Zr 95 
Zr 97 
Nb 95 
Nb 97 
No 99 
Te 99 • 
Ru 103 
Ru 105 
Ru 10« 
Rh 105 
Rh IOC 
Sb 127 
Sb 129 
Ta 127 • 
Ta 127 
Ta 129 a 
Ta 129 
Ta 131 a 
Ta 131 
T« 132 
Jlaount (Vtq) 
240 
570 
14.€ 
1040 
1470 
1.45 
1500 
1970 
2000 
109 
2540 
112 
2500 
3400 
3300 
3400 
3400 
3450 
3220 
2970 
1900 
732 
1000 
002 
107 
507 
17 
195 
107 
505 
204 
1700 
2750 
Isotop« 
X* 
X* 
X* 
X* 
X« 
Cs 
Cs 
Cs 
Cs 
B* 
La 
Ca 
C« 
Ca 
Pr 
Pr 
Nd 
Pa 
Pa 
«P 
Pu 
Pu 
Pu 
Pu 
An 
Ca 
Ca 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
131 a 
133 a 
133 
135 a 
135 
134 
13« 
137 
130 
140 
140 
141 
143 
144 
143 
144 
147 
147 
149 
239 
230 
239 
240 
241 
241 
242 
244 
aaount (Mq) 
1910 
2000 
3310 
4430 
3010 
20.9 
101 
3310 
730 
1050 
111 
C4.S 
142 
3650 
3550 
3010 
3310 
3140 
2200 
3100 
2200 
1310 
312 
1020 
40040 
1.39 
0.039 
0.097 
191 
0.122 
33.0 
0.039 
1 Paq - 1 0 1 5 Bq 
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Table 3. Population distribution about fictive reactor site. 
The data are for a 180° sector to the west of the reactor 
Distance from 
the reactor 
km 
0.5-1 
1-2 
2-5 
5-10 
10-20 
20-50 
site Population 
59 
237 
1662 
11237 
47132 
330013 
Accumulated 
population 
from 0.5 km 
59 
296 
1948 
13185 
60317 
390330 
Table 4. Definition of committed effective dose 
The committed effective dose equivalent is defined as: 
H50B * I WT * H50T 
T 
where 
H50B * Committed effective dose equivalent 
H50T * 50 years committed dose equivalent for target tissue 
(organ T) 
Vfj * Weighting factor for target organ T. 
(The summation involves all body organs). 
Data for H50B' H50T' a n d WT have been taken from ICRP 30 
(ref. ICRP79). 
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Committed effective dose equivalent. 30 years 
i t s 
1M 
IE3 
IE2 
1CI 
ICt 
: 
•
 
I 
_ 1 1 1 1 
•WKt-
sPWR4 N . ^ 
s H I O ^ 
1 1 t _ 1 1 11 
N \ 
\ 
1 1 1 — 
a.s t s it 
dlstone* downwind CkaO 
F l Q . 4 . 1 
R*oclor p o u w i 
2088 MWCth> 
M*t*oreIogIeoI 
cond111on* > 
N»ulrol atoblIlly 
Uind«p«j«d> 6 m/« 
No roln 
sa 
1*1 
Total committed effective dose equivalent to 
individuals from the BWR-2, PWR-4, and BEED re-
leases. 
Coses from deposited activity are integrated 
over 30 years. 
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A c u t e \oon& m o r r o w d o s e . 2 4 h o u r s 
IE3 
IE2 
IEI 
I E ! 
It-I 
I 
-
i——"*^  
-
-
_ 
-
" 
m
il 
* 
1 i i i 
S P W H I ^ N ^ 
^BffD Nv 
1 1 1 M i l 
I 
1 I l _ 
Ruoclor poutr 
2000 MUClh> 
M«l*oroIogIeoI 
condI I Ion« ' 
N«ulrol • t o b l l i t y 
Ui nd«p«od: 6 m/» 
No ro ln 
8.S S 10 
dl s t o n e * downwind C km 3 
58 
Fl« 4 . 2 
4.2 
Total acute bone marrow doses to individuals 
from the BWR-2, PWR-4, and BEED releases. 
Inhalation doses are integrated over 30 days. 
Doses from deposited activity are integrated 
over the first 24 hours after the release. 
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Commi i tied eff«ct i ve dose equivalent . 24 hour: 
1E4 
R u n c l o r * p d u t r : 
2 0 0 0 MUCIIO 
IC3 
I D 
ICI 
I Et 
1—
i 
i 
n
u
; 
- / 
1—
1 
1 
1 
(M
l 
/ 
-
1 1 1 1 
w m 
^HEP N. 
1 1 1 l 1 l l 
\ \ H s t a o r o l o g l c o l 
condl t lort«: 
Navi trol • t o b l t i t y 
Uindap««d> 6 m/s 
No r o l n 
8.5 I S I* 
d l a t o n c « downwind Ck«3 
F l g . 4 . 3 
Total committed effective dose equivalent to 
individuals from the BWR-2, PWR-4, and BEED re-
leases. 
Doses from deposited activity are integrated 
over the first 24 hours after the release. 
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C o m m i t t e d e f f e c t i v e d o s e e q u i v o l e n t . . 3 0 days 
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Total committed effective dose equivalent to 
individuals from the BWR-2, PWR-4/ and BEED re-
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Doses from deposited activity are integrated 
over thu first 30 days after the release. 
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Distribution in isotope groups of collective effective dose equivalent front the BWR-2, 
PWR-4, and BEED releases integrated from 0.5- to 50-km downwind. 
Doses from deposited activity are integrated over 30 years. 
Reactor power: 2000 MW(th). 
Meteorological conditions: Neutral stability. Windspeed 6 m/s. No rain. 
A C U T E B O N E N A R R O W D O S E , 2 4 H O U R S 
BUR2 PUR4 SEED 
• 
i 
: 
M
 
^ 
1 
S 
I 
N 
• s 
I 
I 
* ._ 
^ 
^ 
. 
t 
I.S 1 
N 
• • ,J i — 1 _ 
1 
1 
• n i l . 
i 
^ 
a i 
to 
I 
« • ! • • 4 W > U O I K ] 
F l , . 4 . « • 
dl>la»4* «•»««. lod tka] 
F l , . 4.S b r i g . 4 8 c 
Acute bone marrow doses to individuals distributed in isotope groups for the BWR-2, 
PWR-4, and BEED releases. 
Inhalation doses are integrated over 30 days. Doses from deposited activity are 
integrated over the first 24 hours after the release. 
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split in dose components for the BWR-2, PWR-4, and BEED releases. 
Inhalation doses to bone marrow are integrated over 30 days. Doses from de-
posited activity are integrated over the first 24 hours after the release. 
Reactor power: 2000 MW(th) 
Meteorological conditions: Neutral stability. Wind speed: 6 m/s. No rain. 
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I I Active commi tt«d effective dose equivalent. 30 
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for BWR-2, PHR-4>and BEB> releases. 
Doses from deposited activity are inte-
grated over 30 years. 
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APPENDIX 
RELEASES EXPERIENCED IN REACTOR ACCIDENTS 
H.L. Gjørup 
1. Introduction 
The releases of iodine and other radionuclides during postu-
lated severe accidents in commercial light-water reactor nu-
clear power plants appear to have been overestimated in the 
WASH-1400 study (NRC, 1975). 
A reconsideration of actual releases to the environment in 
past reactor accidents, in particular those experienced at 
Three Mile Island, SL-1, and Windscale, indicates that natural 
fission product removal mechanisms, such as chemical re-
actions, aerosol settling, and the effects of moisture are 
effective to a degree unaccounted for in the conservative 
calculation models used so far. 
2. Three Mile Island 
After the Three Nile Island accident it was noted (Kemeny et 
al., 1979) that the release of iodine to the atmosphere was 5-6 
orders of magnitude smaller than the release of noble gases, al-
though the inventories of iodine and noble gases were of the 
same order of magnitude. 
In a letter to NRC chairman Ahearne, dated August 14, 1980, 
three of the scientists that served at the technical staff of 
the Kemeny Commission offered an explanation (Stratton et al., 
1980). They believe that the iodine in the hot fuel rods reac-
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ted with cesium (which was in excess in proportion to iodine) 
to form cesium iodide and that it emerged from the fuel as 
cesium iodide vapour which would be expected to condense or 
"plate out" when it reached metal surfaces at temperatures at 
or below 400-500°C, entering finally into solution as soon as 
water or condensing steam was encountered. If the iodine was 
not already present in the fuel as iodide it would be converted 
to this form when escaping from the fuel and remain as such 
because of the chemically reducing environment. The vapour press-
sure of iodine over a solution of (cesium) iodide is very low 
and this is the explanation of the exceedingly small release 
of iodine in the Three Nile Island accident. They finally state 
that this qualitative picture is consistent with the small escape 
of iodine observed in a number of incidents when water was pre-
sent, and they believe that an accident involving hot fuel and 
a water or steam-water environment will have the same control-
ing chemical conditions as did the TMI-2 core and primary sys-
tem. The iodine will emerge as cesium iodide (and possibly in 
other iodide forms) and enter into solution as soon as wet steam 
or water is encountered. It will persist in solution as nonvola-
tile iodide as long as oxidizing conditions do not prevail. 
The Three Nile Island accident also initiated a report from BPRI 
(Levenson and Rahn, 1980). The authors of this report observe 
that experience has shown natural phenomena to be very effec-
tive in containing radioactivity. These phenomena are chemical 
reactions, aerosol settling, effects of moisture, etc. The 
authors state that the same natural barriers, which acted in 
the Three Nile Island accident will also act in future acci-
dents. As a result present estimates of radiation exposures 
in connection with core melt-downs may be too high by a factor 
of ten or more. 
A number of cases of radioactivity releases from damaged reac-
tors, experimental reactors tested to destruction and controlled 
experiments, are mentioned as supporting evidence by Levenson 
and Rahn (1980) and by Stratton et al. (1980). Nost notable 
among these cases are two major reactor accidents that resulted 
in radioactive releases to the environment, namely the SL-1 acci-
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dent which occurred at Idaho National Reactor Testing Station 
in January 19(1 and The Windscale accident which occurred in 
October 1957. 
Principally as a result of the above-sentioned letter and re-
port, chairman Ahearne directed the staff of the MRC to pre-
pare a report, as a first step towards resolving the issues. 
This report appeared as a draft in the beginning of March 1981 
(NUREG-0772, 1981). Unfortunately, fission product behavior 
during previous reactor accidents and destructive tests were 
not analysed in the draft report. It was stated, however, that 
the current data base supported the conclusion that cesiun 
iodide is expected to be the predominant iodine for« under 
postulated light-water reactor accidents. At the same time, 
however, it was also concluded that the assumed form of iodine 
does not have a major influence on the estimated iodine release 
to the environment for the risk-dominant accidents. The report 
said that the analyses indicated that the best estimate attenu-
ation factor for iodine is between 2 and 10 for the risk-dominant 
accidents (i.e., 10% to 50% of the core inventory of iodine 
could be released to the environment). 
3. SL-1 
The most pertinent reactor accident not taken into account in 
the above-mentioned report (NUREG-0772) is the SL-1 accident. A 
power excursion melted and partly evaporated ca. 19% of the core 
material. Three per cent of the total core inventory correspond-
ing to ca. 15% of the inventory in the melted material (measured 
as y-activity) was later found in a finely dispersed form on 
the floor and walls of the reactor building (IDO-19311, 1962). 
The water inventory in the reactor was quite low - about 215 
litres in the core and 3,800 litres in the total system (IDO-
19302, 1962). Upon inspection following the accident it was found 
that no water was left in the reactor tank (96th Congress, Serial 
No. 96-14, 1980); later investigations showed that approximately 
2 kg of uranium-235 was missing from the active core region, most 
of this from 16 fuel elements in the centre. 
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Tha original total cora inventory »as 14 kg of uraniua-235 (IDO-
19311, 1962). About 3 a3 of watar was ralaasad vary quickly as 
part of tha staaa haaaar which raisad tha entirw pressure vessel 
about 3 • into the reactor room. Tha peak pressure of the water 
was est iaated at M O ateospheres (Horan, 1901). 
Under these circumstances it is reasonable to assuae that 100% 
of the iodine and cesium in the welted aaterial was released to 
the reactor building. The initial total core inventory at the 
tiaa of the accident was 20000 Ci of iodine-131 and 3100 Ci of 
cesiua-137 (Lavenson and Itahn« 1900). Under the abowa eantioned 
assumptions« the release to the reactor building was thus about 
5300 Ci of iodine-131 and 600 Ci of cesiua-137. There was no 
containaent and the reactor building was "drafty" and vented to 
the ataosphere. The ventilation rate was approximately §40 e*/h, 
and since the voluae of the rooa was 425 a3 this corresponds 
to 1.5 voluae changes per hour. Although about 3 tons of water 
were injected into the reactor rooa no one reported any evidence 
of water on surfacas during the first entries« nor did photos 
taken within tha first few hours give any indications such as« 
e.g.« reflexions. A saall aaount of steaa was seen coning froa 
the building exhaust by tha firaaen on arrival at the reactor 
building about eight ainutes after the excursion (Horan* 1901). 
Nevertheless« only about 20 Ci of iodine-131 and 0.5 Ci of 
cesiua-137 was released to the ataosphere during the first 24 
hours after the accident and about 50 Ci iodine-131 aore during 
the next 30 days (Horan and Gammill« 1943). Tha release per-
centage of iodine-131 to the ataosphere was thus only 0.4% of tha 
5300 Ci injected into the reactor rooa and tha release percent-
age of cesiua-137 to the ataosphere only 0.1% of the 400 Ci in-
jected into the reactor rooa. It saeas likely that these saall 
release percentage can be explained as the result of two cir-
cumstances alone: (1) that iodine eaargad froa the fuel as 
iodide (probably cesiua iodide)« and (2) that water was present 
(although in a Halted aaount) during tha release to the reactor 
rooa. It is noteworthy that a volatile element like tellurium 
seems to have been almost entirely absent in the release to the 
atmosphere (Koran« 1981). 
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4« Cesium release 
In order to explain the low release to the atmosphere of cesium 
in relation to iodine in the SL-1 accident a new concept is in-
troduced here, namely, the idea that while the total release per-
centage for iodine was essentially the same as that for cesium 
iodide then the percentage for all other cesium compounds to-
gether was much lower. This meant that the total release percent-
age for cesium was determined to a high degree by the extent to 
which it was carried away by iodine as cesium iodide. 
In a reactor that has been running for some time about 0.8% of 
the fission product atoms are iodine atoms, mainly stable and 
long-lived ones (0.1% 1 2 7I and 0.7% 1 2 9 I ) ; 19.6% are cesium 
atoms (7% 133Cs, 6.6% 1 3 5 Cs, and 6% 1 3 7Cs), i.e. the ratio 
is 1/25 as far as the number of iodine and cesium atoms in the 
fuel are concerned. In cesium iodide the same ratio is 1/1. 
This means that the ratio of iodine to cesium atoms in 
cesium iodide formed in the fuel is 25 times larger than that 
of all the iodine and cesium atoms present in that fuel. This 
is true for any set of iodine and cesium isotopes, e.g. for 
iodine-131 and cesium-137 which are the isotopes of principal 
interest with respect to radioactivity. It follows that the 
ratio of iodine-131 to cesium-137 radioactivity in any cesium 
iodide formed in the fuel is 25 times larger than the same 
ratio in the fuel as such. 
In the case of the SL-1 accident the amounts of iodine-131 and 
cesium-137 radioactivity in the fuel at the time of the accident 
were, as mentioned above, 5300 and 600 Ci, respectively. There-
fore the ratio of iodine-131 to cesium-137 radioactivity in 
cesium iodide formed in the fuel should be: 
5300 x 25
 x 220 
600 
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The ratio of iodine-131 to cesium-137 radioactivity found in 
the material actually released was 40 if you refer to the 
first 24 hours and 140 if you refer to the first month. 
Stratton et al. (1980) describe the SL-1 accident as one in 
which the chemical nature of the environment (water, steam, 
air) was at first reducing and subsequently oxidizing. If this 
is true it is conceivable that some of the cesium iodide orig-
inally trapped in the reactor building might have oxidized 
when the reactor building dried out, thereby releasing iodine. 
This would explain the rising iodine-to-cesium ratio with time 
in the released material. It is doubtful, however, if this 
ratio were really lower in the beginning since the reported 
amount of released cesium was based on the measurements of 
soil samples covering the entire release period, which would 
have been approximately 30 days (Horan, 1981). There is no 
evidence that the cesium release should have been limited to 
the first 24 hours after the accident. It could just as well 
have been released together with iodine over the entire release 
period. The continuing release of iodine (and cesium?) could 
probably have been prevented, however, by keeping the reactor 
building moist inside. 
In view of the uncertainty with which the released amounts were 
measured, the calculated ratio of 220, and the measured ratio 
of 140 (or even 40) are in reasonable agreement with the proposed 
idea that cesium is released to a large extent as cesium iodide. 
Other cesium compounds presumably constituted at least 96% of 
the total cesium inventory. Apparently they were released to 
the atmosphere to a much lesser extent than cesium iodide. 
5. The Windscale accident 
The large release of iodine to the atmosphere in the case of 
the Windscale accident (about 12% of the inventory in the 8 
tons of fuel were assumed to be involved) is usually explained 
as a result of oxidizing conditions in the pile presumably 
giving rise to large releases of elemental iodine (Stratton et 
al., 1980; Levenson and Rahn, 1980; NUREG-0772, 1981). This 
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picture is probably wrong. The graphite and the fuel in the 
affected region of the pile were very hot, about 1300°C (Atomic 
Energy Office, 1957), and the air-flow restricted to a minimum. 
The graphite and fuel were oxidized and the air that did flow 
through the core was reduced; but since graphite and fuel were 
in excess, the conditions in the pile should be regarded as 
chemically reducing with respect to the cesium iodide escaping 
from the fuel. 
Apparently, the cesium iodide released from the fuel was rather 
stable and was still intact when released to the atmosphere. 
Clark (1974) reports that the amount of non-gaseous nuclides 
retained on the filters of the Windscale pile and the amount 
released to the atmosphere were about the same (i.e. about 50 
per cent filtering efficiency). The filters were designed to 
remove only the larger particles. With respect to the activity 
of iodine-131 and cesium-137 20000-30000 Ci and 800-1000 Ci, 
respectively, were retained on the filters, and 20000 Ci and 600 
Ci, respectively, released to the atmosphere (Clark, 1974). The 
ratio of iodine to cesium in the activity retained on the 
filters is thus, for all practical purposes, the same as that 
of iodine to cesium in the activity released to the atmos-
phere. It is unlikely, therefore, that iodine was released to 
the atmosphere to any appreciable extent either as a gaseous com-
pound or in its elemental form. 
It is evident, however, that cesium was released to the atmos-
phere in amounts larger than can be explained by the release of 
cesium iodide alone. The radioactivity in the involved part of 
the fuel (8 tons) was estimated to be 162000 Ci of iodine-131 
and 12300 Ci of cesium-137 (Clark, 1974). The activity ratio of 
iodine-131 to cesium-137 in cesium iodide formed in this fuel 
would therefore be (162000/12300)x 25 2 330. The activity 
released was 20000 Ci of iodine-131 and 600 Ci of cesium-137 
(Steward and Crooks, 1958). The ratio was thus 33, i.e. the 
amount of cesium released was 10 times larger than that which 
could possibly be explained as carried away by iodine as cesium 
iodide, if all the iodine (lOOt of that present in the fuel) 
had reacted with the corresponding amount of cesium (4% of that 
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present in the fuel). Other cesium compounds must therefore 
have been involved. 
The large difference in cesium iodide release (and the even 
larger differences in the releases of other cesium compounds 
and elements like tellurium) between the SL-1 and the Windscale 
accident can be explained, however, by the lack of water at Wind-
scale (before the fire finally was put out by pouring large a-
mounts of water into the pile thus stopping the subsequent re-
lease of iodine!). At SL-1, on the other hand, some water was 
present, although in small amounts. The steam-water mixture 
ejected from the reactor vessel at the time of the accident was 
obviously sufficient to limit drastically the radioactivity 
released to the atmosphere. 
6. Summary and conclusion 
In the Three Nile Island accident the release of iodine to the 
atmosphere was surprisingly low compared with the release of 
noble gases. This was explained by Stratton et al. (1980) as 
a result of the iodine being released as cesium iodide from the 
fuel to a reducing and wet environment in a containment with 
reasonably maintained integrity. 
In the SL-1 accident the immediate release of iodine-131 to the 
atmosphere was relatively much larger. In addition, a significant 
amount of cesium-137 was released. A comparison of the ratios 
of iodine to cesium in the fuel and in the release suggests that 
the cesium release was determined to a high degree by the extent 
to which it was carried away by iodine as cesium iodide, whereas 
other cesium compounds were not released to a comparable extent. 
Despite the sweeping action of the normal room ventilation and 
the short sweeping burst generated when water and steam were 
expelled from the reactor vessel, the release percentages were 
surprisingly small. 
In the Windscale accident the release of iodine was again re-
latively larger than in the SL-1 accident. A consideration of 
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the conditions in the pile at the time of the accident and a 
comparison of the ratios of iodine to cesium on the filters 
and in the release to the atmosphere suggests that iodine was 
released in a particulate form presumably as cesium iodide. A 
comparison of the ratios of iodine to cesium in the release 
and in the fuel shows that the cesium release was not limited 
to the release of cesium iodide; in fact, the release of other 
cesium compounds was at least 10 times larger. 
The essential difference between the Windscale and SL-1 acci-
dents is that at Windscale no water was present while at SL-1 
a steam-water mixture was expelled from the reactor vessel 
into the reactor building. The scavenging action of this mix-
ture was apparently sufficient to precipitate about 99% of the 
cesium iodide and even more of other cesium compounds and com-
pounds of other radioactive elements, such as tellurium. A 
contributing circumstance might have been that at Windscale 
the activity was drawn out through the chimney by the natural 
draft during the short intervals when the fan dampers were 
opened in an attempt to cool the pile, while at SL-1 the trans-
port of activity to the atmosphere was essentially limited to 
the action of the reactor room ventilation system. 
As mentioned in Section 2.2 of this report it appears that the 
most serious consequences of a core meltdown would be a result 
of a failure to isolate the containment. It is difficult to 
imagine a containment isolation failure more serious than hav-
ing no containment at all as in the SL-1 case, and it is also 
difficult to imagine an LWR with relatively less water present 
than in the SL-1 case. It is concluded, therefore, that it seems 
credible that the release percentages in a serious meltdown 
accident in a modern LWR reactor would not be larger than those 
experienced in the SL-1 accident, i.e./ It of iodine, 0.1% of 
cesium, and 0.02% of barium-strontium. It is estimated that the 
release of lanthanum and ruthenium could be at the same level 
as barium-strontium, while tellurium probably would lie some-
where between iodine and cesium, say 0.5% of the core inventory. 
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Abstract 
The fission-product release to the atmosphere 
from a nuclear reactor during a hypothetical 
large accident is discussed, and the consequence: 
in terms of doses to the population are calcu-
lated. The reactor is a light-water reactor lo-
cated at a site representing an idealized, sim-
plified Danish location. 
Three release categories are discussed: The first 
is the release in an accident with a core melt-
down and a major rupture of the containment. This 
release is represented by the BWR-2 release of 
WASH-1400. The second is the release where the 
containment integrity is maintained, but there 
is a failure to isolate the containment. This re-
lease is represented by the PWR-4 release. The 
third is obtained as a best estimate from empiri-
cal data, and it is called the BEED release. The 
release of the BEED case is deduced from empiri-
cal evidence - especially the SL-1 accident - in 
a separate study which is described in the appen-
dix. The release fractions for the most signifi-
cant elements such as iodine and cesium decrease 
by a decade from BWR-2 to PWR-4, and from PWR-4 
to BEED, while the release fractions of the noble 
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gases are assumed to be at an almost constant high level. 
The dose consequence in terms of a long-term committed effec-
tive dose equivalent is found to be practically directly pro-
portional to the release fractions* i.e. decreasing by a decade 
from BWR-2 to PNR-4, and from PWR-4 to BEED. For the acute bone 
marrow dose the contribution froa the noble gases is significant 
in all three cases* and as the noble gas release is almost con-
stant the decrease from one case to the next is of the order of 
only half a decade. For the BEED case the noble gases* which 
give an external gaaaa dose from the plume, are the most sig-
nificant radioactive fission products* both for long-term and 
acute doses. For the BWR-2 and PWR-4 cases the 1-131 in the 
plume is predominant in the acute dose* while Cs-137 deposited 
on the ground is the main contributor to the long-term dose. 
